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process rights of prisoners had colored the Gagnon ruling. When
the rights at issue are "among the most fundamental and basic of
those guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment," 5 a case-by-case
approach is inappropriate. According to the Fifth Circuit, an abso-
lute right to appointed counsel exists in child dependency proceed-
ings because of the critical nature of the rights adjudicated in such
cases.
One may well conclude that the Fifth Circuit's approach to
child dependency proceedings probes more deeply into the require-
ments of the due process clause than does the Florida analysis. But
unless the Supreme Court of Florida eventually accepts the Fifth
Circuit's position, or until the Supreme Court of the United States
resolves the issue, the two jurisdictions remain in conflict on the
question of right to counsel in dependency matters.
GEORGE DORSETT
Dormant Commerce Clause Revisited:
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.
The extent of permissible state regulation of interstate com-
merce under the "dormant" commerce clause has troubled the Su-
preme Court of the United States ever since Chief Justice Marshall
interpreted the clause as a limitation on the states.1 The Supreme
Court has recognized, however, that certain state regulations may
be matters of local concern, legitimately within the state's police
power.' Because of the peculiarly local nature of highway safety
regulations, for example, the Court traditionally has cloaked them
with a "strong presumption of validity." Despite this presump-
tion, the Supreme Court in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp.,4 held that an Iowa statute prohibiting trucks longer than
fifty-five feet from traveling its roads imposed an unconstitutional
25. 618 F.2d at 384. See No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5058 n.8.
1. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-222 (1824). For an excellent discussion
of Marshall's view of the commerce clause, see F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WHITE (1937).
2. Health and consumer protection, for example, are matters of local concern. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 351 (1977).
3. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
4. 101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981).
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burden on interstate commerce.
Although the Iowa statute generally restricted trucks to fifty-
five feet in length, the statute contained exemptions: vehicles haul-
ing livestock,5 farm equipment,6 and mobile homes7 could reach a
combined length of sixty feet. Certain trucks called "doubles"
could also be as long as sixty feet.' In addition, Iowa's statute pro-
vided a "border-cities" exemption that permitted border cities to
adopt the length limitations of a neighboring state, thereby al-
lowing oversized trucks to travel within a border city's limits and
to certain designated commercial areas in Iowa.'
Consolidated Freightways Corporation (Consolidated), a major
interstate carrier, brought suit in federal district court, challenging
the constitutionality of Iowa's statutory scheme.10 The district
court entered judgment for Consolidated, concluding that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v.
Rice" was controlling. In Raymond, two of the largest interstate
carriers in the country" had challenged a Wisconsin law that
banned trucks over fifty-five feet from its highways. Wisconsin de-
fended its statute by asserting that it was a reasonable safety mea-
sure authorized by the state's police power. The state "virtually
defaulted," however, in producing evidence sufficient to persuade
the Court that the law made any contribution to highway safety. ' s
In light of the Wisconsin law's undisputed burden on interstate
commerce,14 the Raymond Court decided that the scale tipped
5. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.457(3) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
6. Id. § 321.456(4) (West 1966).
7. Id. § 321.457.
8. Id. § 321.457(6).
9. Id. § 321.457(7) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
10. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 475 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Iowa 1979). Be-
cause of Iowa's law, Consolidated could not use its 65-foot trucks through Iowa. Interstate
80 runs through Iowa and links the east and west coast. All states except New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, and Iowa permitted 65-foot trucks on their roads. Interstate 35, a principal north-
south route, also runs through Iowa. Sixty-five-foot trucks were legal in all states on "1-35"
except for Iowa.
Consolidated diverted its 65-foot trucks around Iowa, increasing distances and, in turn,
the costs of its trucking operation. The added distance also subjected the interstate road
system to more wear and tear and resulted in a greater number of accidents and fatalities on
the road. Id. at 547.
11. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
12. Consolidated was a plaintiff in Raymond, as well. Id. at 431.
13. Id. at 444. In Raymond, plaintiffs claimed that the state law forced them to divert
their trucks around Wisconsin; this diversion increased operating costs and caused substan-
tial delays. Id. at 445. The state of Wisconsin made no attempt to rebut plaintiffs' conten-
tions. Id. n.20.
14. Id. at 447.
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overwhelmingly in favor of the federal interest in maintaining an
unobstructed flow of interstate commerce.
Heeding the warning of Raymond-that a mere recital of a
safety purpose will not shield a state's highway regulation from an
attack under the commerce clause-Iowa made an "all out effort" 15
to present evidence supporting the legitimacy of its regulation as a
safety measure. But Iowa failed to persuade the district court in
Kassel that Iowa's truck length restrictions made a safety contri-
bution substantial enough to justify encumbering interstate com-
merce. According to the district court, the evidence "convincingly,
if not overwhelmingly," 16 established that Consolidated's sixty-
five-foot trucks were just as safe as the fifty-five-foot trucks per-
mitted under Iowa law. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eight Circuit accepted the district court's findings and upheld
its decision as a proper application of Raymond.1 7
The Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality opinion written by
Justice Powell.18 For Powell, Kassel was "Raymond revisited."1 9
The trial record supported the district court's finding that Consoli-
dated's trucks were as safe as the shorter trucks mandated by Iowa
law. In addition, the effect and legislative history of the statute's
exemptions favored Iowa citizens at the expense of interstate com-
merce, 20 and evidenced a discriminatory purpose.' After weighing
the "asserted safety purpose [of the state law] against the degree
of interference with interstate commerce,"'" the Court held the
statute invalid under the commerce clause.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the Iowa
statute discriminated against interstate commerce.'3 According to
Justice Brennan, however, a balancing of the law's effect as a valid
safety measure against its effect on interstate commerce is not an
appropriate method for reviewing a state's highway regulation. In-
stead, argued Brennan, the Court should have examined the state
lawmakers' actual intent in passing the legislation for more conclu-
15. 475 F. Supp. at 548.
16. Id.
17. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 612 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1979).
18. 101 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (1981). Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Jus-
tice Powell's plurality opinion.
19. Id. at 1316.
20. Id. at 1319-20.
21. Id. at 1320.
22. Id. at 1316 (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443).
23. Id. at 1320. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.
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sive evidence reflecting discriminatory motive. 4
Justice Rehnquist dissented." He argued that the conclusion
of the plurality and concurring opinions "seriously intrudes upon
the fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the
safety of their citizens."'26 He claimed the trial record supported
the legislature's determination that fifty-five-foot and sixty-foot
length requirements related to safety. The question for the Court
should have been whether Iowa's legislature had acted rationally in
imposing the truck length restrictions. Because of the strong pre-
sumption of validity traditionally accorded a state's highway regu-
lation, Iowa had to demonstrate only that the regulation's benefit
was more than slight. Rather than comparing the impact on safety
of Iowa's truck length limitation to that of Consolidated's truck
lengths, the Court should have weighed the benefit of the state's
regulation against the harm of having no regulation at all. A state
legislature may determine, as a matter of policy, what constitutes a
reasonable length for trucks. According to Justice Rehnquist, a
classification should not be "rejected merely because the weight of
the evidence in court appears to favor a different standard.' 7
By striking down the state regulation in Kassel, the Court ex-
panded the scope of Raymond, which had expressly limited its
holding to a case in which the state had failed to make even a col-
orable claim that its highway regulation contributed to safety. 8 In
Kassel, the state produced expert witnesses, studies, and statistics
to defend its law, but the Court concluded that the evidence had
slight probative value.'9
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
however, the record did support the state's contention that the law
promoted highway safety. In light of the deference usually ac-
corded highway regulations said to promote safety, it is curious
that the Court did not view the evidence in a more favorable light.
The Court apparently based its decision on its view that the law
was really a pretext for discrimination. Both the plurality and the
concurring opinions concluded that the statute discriminated
against interstate commerce: the plurality reached its decision by
considering only the imbalance between the law's benefit to high-
24. Id. at 1321.
25. Id. at 1324. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined Justice Rehnquist.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1329 (quoting Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939)).
28. 434 U.S. at 447-48.
29. 101 S. Ct. at 1317.
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way safety and its burden on interstate commerce. The dissenting
opinion, however, found the law nondiscriminatory, based on some
evidence that it was intended to promote safety.
If the Court continues to apply the Raymond balancing ap-
proach to state highway laws affecting interstate commerce, then
no matter what evidence a state produces, Kassel suggests that the
Court will no longer clothe that law with a presumption of validity.
Rather, the Court's interpretation of the evidence may turn mainly
on the law's effect on interstate carriers; the greater the burden,
the greater the presumption that the law is a mere pretext for
discrimination.
AMY LEHMAN
